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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1794
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTJF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001336

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [SOCI](#) [AU](#) [UNSC](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: MACHAR EXPECTS SEPTEMBER 6 MEETING WITH LRA

¶1. (SBU) Summary: In an August 28 meeting with ConGen Juba, GOSS Vice President Riek Machar expressed his confidence that LRA Leader Joseph Kony would meet him in Rikwangba on September 6 to discuss the Juba Peace Agreement. Machar thought it possible Kony would sign the agreement on that day, although he did not have Kony's commitment to do so. Despite Machar's confidence, others, including UNMIS, tell ConGen Juba they remain skeptical an agreement will ever be signed by Kony. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) ConGen Juba met GOSS VP and Chief Mediator for the LRA Peace Talks Riek Machar on August 28 to discuss the latest developments in the LRA peace talks. A meeting with Kony had been planned in Rikwangba on August 24, and Machar explained that date had fallen through due to miscommunications within the SPLA. He claimed that SPLA units, not properly informed of the gathering, opened fire on advance LRA units on August 22, and they returned fire. Both sides then fell back with no reported casualties on either side.

¶3. (SBU) Machar said that Kony was advised of the reasons for the misunderstanding and accepted to reset the meeting for September 6.

¶4. (SBU) ConGen asked Machar if he really thought Kony would show up on September 6 given his failure to appear at numerous, previously scheduled meetings.. In addition to this, Kony's paranoia was legendary and his troops had just been in a fire fight with the SPLA. In reply, Machar expressed confidence that this time Kony would actually come. Asked why he was so sure, Machar answered that according to his sources, many northern Ugandans who had opposed the peace deal now understood that it was a good deal for them and were pressing Kony to sign. In addition, Kony was no longer asking for any food or support as a precondition, and he understood the agreement better now that he had had time to study it for himself. Particularly on the issue of the ICC indictments, the recent move to indict GNU President Omar al Bashir had, according to Machar, caused Kony to realize that he was in a stronger position than Bashir to deal with the ICC, since the Juba Peace Agreement called for a deferment of his indictments so he could face justice in Uganda.

¶5. (SBU) Asked who would be going to Rikwangba on September 6, Machar said he would, along with UN representatives (including UN Special Envoy Joaquim Chisanno), Government of Uganda representatives, and, he hoped, members of the monitoring group.

¶6. (SBU) Machar admitted that currently the September 6 meeting was set only to discuss the Juba Peace Agreement, but he said he thought the chances were good that Kony would sign it. Kony understood now that if he signed, an implementation period would follow in which he could verify that peace agreement conditions were being met before he would be required to lay down his arms.

¶7. (SBU) Comment: September 6 is the latest in a series of proposed meetings with Kony dating back to April, and ConGen Juba shares

widespread skepticism outside of VP Machar's office that the elusive LRA leader will finally show up. Increasingly, those outside of Machar's office are talking of "Plan B," to go after Kony militarily. The problem is, Kony will be a hard man to catch, even with the forces of South Sudan, Uganda and the DRC in combined pursuit. He has a large area in which to operate and has proven himself adept at avoiding capture while terrorizing local populations and wreaking general havoc.

FERNANDEZ